The paperback edition of Barron Lerner's gripping medical and cultural history of breast cancer in twentieth-century America, first published in 2001, contains a postscript about the latest 'breast cancer war'. As historian, clinician, scientist, he saw that the same themes were being played out in the near pandemonium that ensued from a front-page story in the New York Times. This new skirmish between screening sceptics and believers revolved around the findings of a systematic review by Olsen and Götzsche (Lancet, 2001; 358: 1340-2) showing that there was no evidence that mammographic screening reduced mortality from breast cancer and that it led to more aggressive treatments. For Lerner the episode was a further demonstration of how social and cultural factors can influence the interpretation of scientific data. Evidence is still an ineffective weapon against belief.
The Breast Cancer Wars teaches us that disease cannot be understood outside its social and cultural context: culture, philosophy and attitude determine the acceptability of a course of action. In this exciting and wide-ranging narrative, Lerner opens our eyes to appreciate that evaluation of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions has always depended on time and place. The personal accomplishments of colourful and influential characters from Sir William Halsted onwards are placed in their proper historical context, set against the larger social system in which they worked. Although mortality statistics remained unchanged, belief in Halsted's radical mastectomy kept it going for three-quarters of a century. Mid-century challenges by proponents of biological predeterminism, who using new statistical approaches proposed that the inherent biology of individual breast cancers-as opposed to early intervention-most influenced whether patients lived or died, were vigorously resisted by surgeons. Rose Kushner, American journalist and breast cancer patient, posed a conspicuous challenge to the traditional authoritarian physician/patient relationship, radical surgery and the one-step procedure, in a vigorous, intelligent and wellresearched campaign. In Breast Cancer: a Personal and Investigative Report (Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1975) she questioned surgeons' blind adherence to Halsted's methods. Kushner's main target, as a civil libertarian, was the arrogant way the medical profession went about its business. The language of the rallying call to women to 'have a finger in their own destiny' and engage as powerful combatants in this new-style battle was irresistible. Activism was born.
Armed with the insight that Lerner's riveting history can provide, clinicians, patients, medical journalists, the media, politicians, policy-makers and scientists could learn to reduce the bloodshed and collateral damage inflicted on women by over-zealous detection and eradication. Today, as in Halsted's time, so much of what we do and what we believe hinges on the perennial disagreement over the value of early detection. The latest skirmish again demonstrates the limits of scientific evidence to resolve contentious clinical issues. A soldier fears maiming more than death: saved lives must not be at the expense of damaged lives.
Normal follicular anatomy is covered in detail, in particular the technical processing needed to produce the sections for horizontal viewing: this methodology is of great value for the histopathology of chronic telogen effluvium and androgenetic alopecia. In 28 chapters Sperling deals with all the areas of hair and scalp diseases, including detailed attention to differential diagnosis-particularly well covered in the fibrosing alopecias. The sections on senile alopecia (senescent balding) are very important; many clinicians and skin pathologists in their ignorance doubt the existence of this entity-but it does exist, as shown here with great clarity. I cannot imagine any dermatopathologist not wanting to possess this atlas. In the UK it would now be considered extraordinary to conduct research without consulting a research ethics committee. Yet clinical ethics consultation-arrangements for seeking advice about difficult questions of values in clinical practice-is almost unknown in this country. Despite the longstanding custom of consulting expert colleagues on difficult clinical issues, the idea seems strange to many. This is not so in the United States, where clinical ethics consultation services are well established. The conduct of such services is the subject of this book. The need for ethics consultation is taken as axiomatic, and the book covers a wide range of issues about the role and conduct of these services.
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What is the purpose of ethics consultation? Is it to clarify the issues in a particular case (a traditional role for moral philosophers), to facilitate decision-making for those involved, to help them communicate and resolve problems in personal relationships, or to offer an 'expert opinion'? If the last, is this merely a matter of technical skill, or must practitioners also have a particular moral education and quality of moral character? Should ethics consultation be offered by individuals or by a committee? Should there be a formal system of certification for ethics consultants, as with other specialists? From what perspective does one offer ethical advice in a culturally and morally pluralistic society? How should such services be organized, and what support do they require? The United States is a very different culture from our own, but there are issues here for the UK. The rational analysis of ethical problems is as much an intellectual skill as clinical diagnosis, and training in this skill now forms part of the undergraduate curriculum of most UK medical schools. It does not seem unreasonable therefore that, faced with a particularly tricky ethical problem, a doctor should seek the advice of someone who has paid particular attention to learning this skill, any more than it is odd that I, as a general practitioner, should ask a cardiologist for help with a particularly recalcitrant case of hypertension.
When faced with a tricky ethical problem, as with a clinical dilemma, most doctors will naturally discuss it with colleagues, but arrangements for doing this in the UK tend to be informal and unstructured. Might more formal structures lead to better decisions? Clinical work places tremendous psychological pressure on practitioners, and our culture does not always provide satisfactory mechanisms for dealing with these. Dinniss (BMJ 1999; 319: 929) has discussed the phenomenon whereby, when doctors meet at the dinner table, they are soon exchanging horrific stories about their medical experiences-a sort of catharsis, he judges, to cope with the emotional and psychological pressures. Among these, along with death and suffering, are conflicts of values, where a decision has to be made and all the options are wrong. The idea that doctors are omniscient, invulnerable superbeings is no longer dominant in our society. Yet paradoxically expectations of a perfect standard of service have risen, fuelled by political pressures, league tables and organizations promoting patients' rights. In this climate a more formal system for seeking help with difficult ethical problems might not only protect patients but also support doctors.
In their book, Aulisio and his co-authors offer a good insight into how such systems work in practice. For the UK culture and healthcare system they would have to be very different, but the observations recorded here deserve close study by anyone who contemplates setting up a referral system for medical staff facing ethical dilemmas.
